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RECENT BOOKS 
BOOK REVIEWS 
IMPACT OF NEw WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY ON lNTERNATioNAL LAw: 
SELECTED AsPECTs. By Eric Stein. In 1971-II ACADEMIE DE DROIT IN-
TERNATIONAL, R.ECUEIL DES COURS. Leyden: A. w. Sijthoff. 1972. 
Pp. 223-388. $18.22. 
In article 8 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Mem-
bers of the League recognized that the maintenance of peace re-
quired the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point con-
sistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action 
of international obligations. In the more than one-half century since 
the entry into force of the Covenant of the League, thousands of inter-
governmental meetings have been held within and outside the 
League of Nations and, after World War II, under the auspices of 
the United Nations and independently from it. Tens of thousands 
of pages of official records and other intergovernmental documenta-
tion have been devoted to debates, draft instruments, and studies of 
the problems related to promoting "the establishment and main-
tenance of international peace and security with the least diversion 
for armaments of the world's human and economic resources";1 to 
"the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of arma-
ments" ;2 and to "the regulation of armaments, and possible disarma-
ment."3 
One of the consequences of these developments has been that 
even experts in the fields of international law and international 
relations have had great difficulty in finding their way through the 
unwieldy mass of documentary materials and in evaluating the re-
sults of these decades of endeavor. 
Professor Stein's Hague Lectures, Impact of New Weapons Tech-
nology on International Law, are an invaluable introduction to, and 
a reliable guide through, the actions and developments in the post-
World War II era or, as the title modestly adds, Selected Aspects 
thereof. Professor Stein recalls that less than a month after the sign-
ing of the Charter of the United Nations on June 26, 1945, the first 
nuclear device was exploded at Alamogordo, New Mexico. "The 
combined effects of East-West confrontation beginning in 1946 and 
the emergence of new weapons in the final phase of the Second 
World War undercut the basic assumptions of the Charter system 
and raised the question of its viability in such a profoundly trans-
1. U.N. CHARTER art. 26. 
2. U.N. CHARTER art. ll, para. 2. 
3. U.N. CHARTER art. 47, para. 1. 
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formed environment" (p. 240). Attempts to remedy this situation 
were initiated immediately. The very first resolution that the General 
Assembly of the United Nations adopted established a "Commis-
sion to deal with the problems raised by the discovery of atomic 
energy" and charged it to make specific proposals, inter alia, "for 
control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure its use 
only for peaceful purposes" and "for the elimination from national 
armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons 
adaptable to mass destruction."4 The United Nations was, of course, 
also concerned with the "general regulation and reduction of arma-
ments,"5 and, in February 1947, the Security Council established a 
"Commission for Conventional Armaments" that for some time 
worked parallel with the Atomic Energy Commission. 
I. COROLLARY OR COLLATERAL MEASURES 
Through the heightened bipolarity arising from developments 
both within and outside the United Nations after 1946, the two 
superpowers played an increasingly dominant role in all disarma-
ment negotiations. They "gradually came to recognise a co-operative 
aspect to their adversary relations" (p. 248). The objective became 
to isolate those areas in which common interests were apparent and 
the "need for trust was minimal" (p. 248). This made it necessary to 
turn "from exclusive consideration of comprehensive disarmament 
schemes toward increased emphasis upon 'partial', 'corollary' or 
'collateral' measures" (p. 249). These measures are the tangible 
result of the work of recent decades, and their examination and 
explanation constitute the principal contents of the lectures under 
review. Professor Stein presents and comments upon the following 
"collateral" measures. 
A. The Establishment of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency 
The first measure to reach fruition was the I 956 agreement to 
establish the International Atomic Energy Agency. 6 Its founding had 
been proposed personally by President Eisenhower in an address be-
fore the General Assembly in December 1953. The Agency's 
twin goal was to reduce gradually stockpiles of fissionable materials 
by transferring limited quantities from national to international 
control, and to employ the materials so transferred for the world-
wide development of peaceful uses of the atom .... The Agency has 
4. G.A. Res. l[IJ, U.N. Doc. A/64 (1946). 
5. G.A. Res. 4l[IJ, U.N. Doc. A/64/Add.l (1946). 
6. Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, [1956] 2 U.S.T. 1093, T.I.A.S. 
No. 3873 (effective July 24, 1957). 
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not been able to pursue its intended arms control objective. In fact, 
until recently it was confined essentially to technical assistance 
functions. [Pp. 250-51.] 
The recent addition to the functions of the Agency to which Stein 
refers is the acceptance of the Agency's safeguards system by non-
nuclear-weapon States, parties to the Treaty on the Non-Prolifera-
tion of Nuclear Weapons of 1968, which is dealt with below.7 
B. The "Hot Line" 
By a memorandum of understanding signed at Geneva in 1963, 
the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agreed 
to establish, for use in time of emergency, a direct communications 
link between the two govemments.8 It is known that the "hot line" 
was used during the outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East in 
1967 (pp. 251 & 259). 
C, Collateral Measures Relating Specifically and Exclusively 
to Nuclear Weapons 
I. The Test Ban Treaty of 1963 
In the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, 
in Outer Space and Under Water9 signed at Moscow by the Soviet 
Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States on August 5, 
1963: 
Each of the Parties ... undertakes to prohibit, to prevent, and not to 
carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear 
explosion, at any place under its jurisdiction or control: 
(a) in the atmosphere; beyond its limits, including outer space; 
or under water, including territorial waters or high seas; or 
(b) in any other environment if such explosion causes radioactive 
debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under 
whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted .... 10 
Each party further undertakes not to encourage or assist in the car-
rying out of a nuclear explosion that would take place in any of the 
prohibited environments.11 With one exception,12 the Test Ban 
7. [1970] 1 U.S.T. 483, T.I.A.S. No. 6839 (effective March 5, 1970). See text ac• 
companying notes 14-20 infra. 
8. U.S.S.R. and United States Memorandum of Understanding (with Annex) Re-
garding the Establishment of a Direct Communications Link, [1963] 1 U.S.T. 825, T.I.A.S. 
No. 5326, 473 U.N.T.S. 163 (effective June 23, 1963). 
9. [1963] 2 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S. 43 (effective Oct. IO, 1963}. 
IO. Art. I, [1963] 2 U.S.T. at 1316-17, T.I.A.S. No. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S. at 45. 
11. Art. I, [1963] 2 U.S.T. at 1316-17, T.I.A.S. No. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S. at 45. 
12. The other instrument that will require states to abandon a specified weapon 
activity in which they had been engaged is the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons of 
1971. See notes 43-57 infra and accompanying text. 
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Treaty remains the only collateral measure "that has compelled three 
of the five nuclear powers (including the superpowers), to desist, 
albeit not entirely, from a significant weapon activity in which they 
had been previously engaged" (p. 327).13 France and China did not 
become parties to the Test Ban Treaty. Although the Treaty has 
neither slowed down the nuclear armament race or halted weapons 
testing, the Treaty commitment remains significant for a number of 
reasons: by allowing only underground testing, which limits the 
testing of large yield weapons, the Treaty, in effect, places a ceiling 
on the continually increasing nuclear explosive yields in the multi-
megaton range; by precluding operational tests, the Treaty serves 
to heighten the uncertainty regarding the effectiveness of new nuclear 
weapons systems; by confining the testing to the more difficult and 
expensive underground environment, the Treaty imposes a techno-
logical barrier which will necessarily "retard the pace of nuclear 
weapons proliferation" (p. 328); by forbidding atmospheric testing, 
the Treaty has significantly reduced radioactive contamination; by 
committing the parties "to seek to achieve" agreement on extending 
the ban to underground tests, the Treaty encourages a more com-
prehensive agreement (pp. 327-29). 
2. The Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 
In contrast to the Test Ban Treaty, which restrains all States from 
enumerated activities with respect to nuclear weapons tests and other 
nuclear explosions, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
·weapons of July I, 1968, restrains non-nuclear-weapon States "from 
any activity with respect to specified weapons and devices (nuclear 
weapons and other nuclear explosive devices), including their ac-
quisition and possession" (p. 329). Referring by implication to "the 
principle of sovereign equality" of all United Nations Members,14 
Stein gives to one of his sections dealing with the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty the title "Sovereign Inequality" (p. 334). 
The United Nations Charter institutionalised political-military in-
equality by giving privileged treatment to the "great powers," as 
permanent members of the Security Council. The International 
Atomic Energy Agency and other international organisations reflect 
this inequality in the composition of their governing bodies. . . . 
[T]he institutionalisation of inequality in favour of the nuclear 
powers carries over to the "final clauses" and amendment provisions 
of the collateral measures. It is in the Non-Proliferation Treaty, how-
ever, that the legal distinction between nuclear-weapon States and 
non-nuclear weapon States acquires dramatic dimensions. [P. 285, 
emphasis added.] 
13. Underground testing is still permissible as long as radioactive material does 
not cross national boundaries. 
14. U.N. CHARTER art. 2(1), para. I (emphasis added). 
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The nuclear-weapon States undertake not to "transfer" nuclear 
weapons "to any recipient whatsoever," and not to "assist, encourage, 
or induce" non-nuclear-weapon States to "manufacture or other-
wise acquire nuclear weapons."15 The prohibitions apply not only 
to nuclear weapons, but also to "other nuclear explosive devices."16 
The obligations of the non-nuclear-weapon States are almost sym-
metrical to the restrictions undertaken by the nuclear-weapon States 
except that the non-nuclear-weapon States are also barred from 
acquiring nuclear weapons even through their own efforts.17 As 
already indicated, non-nuclear-weapon States undertake to accept 
safeguards, as set forth in the agreements to be negotiated and con-
cluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency (pp. 329-37). 
Nothing in the Treaty "shall be interpreted as affecting the inalien-
able right of all the Parties ... to develop research, production and 
use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes .... "18 "Each Party ... 
undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that ... potential 
benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be 
made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on 
a nondiscriminatory basis .... "19 All parties to the Treaty undertake 
"to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating 
to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear 
disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament 
under strict and effective international control."20 
3. The Treaty of Tlatelolco of 1967 
The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin 
America,21 signed in Tlatelolco, a section of Mexico City, on Febru-
ary 14, 1967, is not exhaustively treated in Stein's lectures because 
"the father of the Treaty," Dr. Alfonso Garcia Robles (of Mexico) 
discussed it comprehensively in the same cycle of the Hague Lec-
tures.22 However, there is in existence an Additional Protocol II to 
the Treaty of Tlatelolco23 by which the parties to the Protocol under-
take not to contribute in any way to the performance of acts involving 
a violation of the obligations imposed by the Treaty in the zone of its 
15. Art. I, [1970] I U.S.T. at 487, T.I.A.S. No. 6839. 
16. Art. I, [1970] 1 U.S.T. at 487, T.I.A.S. No. 6839. 
17. Art. II, [1970] I U.S.T. at 487, T.I.A.S. No. 6839. 
18. Art. IV, [1970] l U.S.T. at 489, T.I.A.S. No. 6839. 
19. ArL V, [1970] 1 U.S.T. at 490, T .I.A.S. No. 6839. 
20. Art. VI, [1970] l U.S.T. at 490, T.I.A.S. No. 6839. 
21. U.N. Doc. A/ C.1/1946 (1967), [1971] 1 U.S.T. 762 (effective Feb. 14, 1967). 
22. A. GARcfA ROBLES, MEsuRES DE DESARMEMENT DANS DES ZONES PARTICULIERES: LE 
TRAITE VISANT L'!NTERDICTION DES ARMES NUCLEAIRES EN AMfruQUE LATINE, IN 1971-ll 
ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, RECUEIL DES COORS 43-134 (1972). 
23. [1971] 1 U.S.T. 754, T.I.A.S. No. 7137 (effective May 12, 1971). 
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application and by which they also undertake not to use or threaten 
to use nuclear weapons against the contracting parties of the Treaty. 
The conclusion of this regional arrangement was encouraged by 
the General Assembly as early as 1963.24 The General Assembly has 
repeatedly expressed its interest in the ratification of Additional 
Protocol II by all nuclear-weapon States;25 thus in 1970 it noted with 
satisfaction that the United Kingdom had ratified the Protocol26 and 
similarly noted in 1971 that the United States had done the same.27 
At the same time, the General Assembly deplored the fact that the 
other nuclear-weapon States have not yet heeded the urgent appeals 
it had made in three different resolutions and urged them once again 
to sign and ratify Additional Protocol II without further delay.28 At 
its 1972 session, the General Assembly recalled that the United King-
dom and the United States had become parties to Additional Proto-
col II and also welcomed the solemn declaration of the Government 
of the People's Republic of China on November 14, 1972, that at no 
time and in no circumstances will China be the first to use nuclear 
weapons, and that, as a specific undertaking regarding the nuclear-
weapon free zone in Latin America, China will never use or threaten 
to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear Latin American coun-
tries and the nuclear-weapon free zone, nor will China test, manu-
facture, produce, stockpile, install, or deploy nuclear weapons in these 
countries or in this zone. 29 
Stein points out that the ratification of Additional Protocol II is 
the first treaty obligation undertaken by the United States-and the 
same would seem to apply to the United Kingdom-not to use or 
threaten to use nuclear weapons. By its terms, this obligation is ap-
plicable only to Latin American States that are parties to the Treaty. 
The "United States qualified its adherence in an 'understanding' to 
the effect that the obligation would not apply in the event of an 
armed attack by a party with the assistance of a nuclear-weapon State" 
(pp. 321-22). 
D. Prevention of the Extension of the Arms Race to 
Newly Accessible Environments 
I. The Antarctic Treaty of 1959 
By prescribing that the Antarctic shall be used only for peaceful 
purposes, it is the objective of the Antarctic Treaty30 to preserve the 
24, G.A. Res. 19ll (XVIII), 18 U.N. GAOR Supp. 15 at 14, U.N. Doc. A/5597 (1963). 
25. See G.A. Res. 2286 (XXIII), 22 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16 at 13, U.N. Doc. A/6921 
(1967); G.A. Res. 2456B (XXIII), 23 U.N. GAOR Supp. 18 at 13, U.N. Doc. A/7445 (1968). 
26. G.A. Res. 2666 (XXV), 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 25 at 17, U.N. Doc. A/8184 (1970). 
27. G.A. Res. 2830 {XXVI), 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. 29 at 34, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1971). 
28. Id. 
29. G.A. Res. 2935 (XXVII), 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. - at-, U.N. Doc. - (1972). 
30. Art. IX para. l(a), [1961] 1 U.S.T, 794, 798, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, 402 U.N.T.S. 71, 
78 (effective June 23, 1961). 
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continent's nonmilitarized status. It prohibits, inter alia, "any 
measures of a military nature, such as the establishment of military 
bases and fortifications, the carrying out of military maneuvers, as 
well as the testing of any type of weapons."31 "Agreement on this pro-
vision was in large measure due to the fact that, unlike the Arctic 
areas, the Antarctic has been considered of a limited strategic value 
... " (p. 309). 
2. The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 
The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in 
the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and 
Other Celestial Bodies,32 provides that "[t]he exploration and use of 
outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be 
carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, ir-
respective of their degree of economic or scientific development and 
shall be the province of all mankind."33 
The moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States 
Parties . . . exclusively for peaceful purposes. The establishment of 
military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type 
of weapons and the conduct of military maneuvers on celestial bodies 
shall be forbidden. The use of military personnel for scientific 
research or for any other peaceful purposes shall not be prohibited . 
• • • 34 
Professor Stein quotes Fawcett, who points out that the " 'stock 
phrase 'outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies' 
is used twenty-two times in thirteen Articles, and its components 
are sometimes used separately.'" (pp. 312-13 n.12).35 The omission of 
the moon from the critical provision in article IV(a) prohibiting the 
establishment of military bases is an "oddity.''36 
The Treaty prohibits only certain uses of a specified type of 
weapon in outer space: "States Parties to the Treaty undertake not 
to place in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear 
weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install 
such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer 
space in any other manner.''37 In Stein's opinion, the Treaty does not 
impose complete demilitarization of outer space. The use of outer 
31. Art. I, [1961) 1 U.S.T. at 795, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, 402 U.N.T.S. at 72. 
32. [1967) 3 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347 (effective Oct. 10, 1967). 
33. Art. I, [1967) 3 U.S.T. at 2412, T.I.A.S. No. 6347. 
34. Art. IV, [1967) 3 U.S.T. at 2414, T.I.A.S. No. 6347. 
35. J. FAWCE'IT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USES OF OUTER SPACE 35 (1968). 
36. The "omission of the Moon must either be intentional, or an egregious mistake, 
only to be saved by sayiDg that the whole tenor requires that the expression 'celestial 
bodies' in that sentence must include the Moon" (pp. 312-13 n.12, quoting J. FAWCETT 
at 35). 
S7- Art. IV, [1967] 3 U.S.T. at 2413, T.I.A,S. No. 6347, 
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space for reconnaissance purposes is accepted as legitimate activity 
(pp. 314-15). 
3. The Sea-Bed Arms Control Treaty of 1971 
The Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear 
and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the 
Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof,38 referred to by Stein as the 
"Sea-Bed Treaty," was "commended" by the General Assembly on 
December 7, 1970,39 and opened for signature on February II, 1971. 
Parties to the Treaty are bound "not to emplant or emplace" nuclear 
weapons or other weapons of mass destruction-nor facilities de-
signed for launching or testing of such weapons-on "the sea bed 
and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof" beyond the outer limit 
of a "sea-bed zone."40 
The prohibitions do not apply "either to the coastal State or 
to the sea bed beneath its territorial waters."41 
This obscure clause means that a coastal State remains free . . . to 
emplace weapons of mass destruction within the entire twelve-mile 
zone adjacent to its coast ... in addition, any other State, party to 
the Treaty, would be free, with the consent of such coastal State, to 
emplace such weapons within the latter's territorial waters zone (the 
so-called "allied option"). [P. 319.] 
The United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has 
represented the Sea-Bed Treaty as prohibiting "mass destruction 
weapons on nearly 70 per cent of the earth's surface."42 "It must be 
kept in mind, however, that neither superpower has considered the 
stationing of such weapons on the sea-bed as strategically useful, 
mainly because they would be more vulnerable there than on sub-
marine vehicles" (p. 321). 
E. The Convention on Bacteriological (Biological) 
Warfare of 1971 
When Professor Stein presented his Hague Lectures in the sum-
mer of 1971, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin 
38. Text in IO U.S. ARMs CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, ANN. REP. 37-40 (1971) 
[hereinafter 10 ANN. REP.]; U.S. ARMs AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, 1970 DoCUl\1ENTS ON 
DISARMAMENT 475 (1971). 
39. G.A. Res. 2660, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28 at 11, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970). 
40. Art. I(l) in IO ANN. REP., supra note 38, at 37. The "sea-bed zone" is defined as 
being coterminous with the outer limit of the zone referred to in the Geneva Conven-
tion on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of 1958, arts. III-XIII, [1964] 2 
U.S.T. 1606, 1610-12, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205, 208-14 (effective Sept. IO, 1964). 
41. Art. 1(2), in IO ANN. REP., supra note 38, at 37. 
42. IO ANN. REP., supra note 381 at 9. 
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Weapons and on Their Destruction existed only as a draft.48 It was 
subsequently completed and commended by the General Assembly -
on December 16, 1971.44 
In 1925, the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in 
War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases and of Bacteriological 
Methods of Warfare45 was signed. The Protocol declared that the 
prohibition of "the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other 
gases and of all analogous liquids, materials, or devices . . . shall be 
universally accepted as a part of international law, binding alike the 
conscience and the practice of nations."46 The parties to the Protocol 
of 1925 agreed to extend this prohibition to the use of bacteriological 
methods of warfare. The Protocol "is now binding upon ninety-si.x 
nations, including all the major military and industrial powers with 
the sole exception of the United States" (p. 298). In August 1970 the 
President of the United States resubmitted the Protocol to the Senate 
for its advice and consent to ratification, subject to a certain reserva-
tion.47 Moreover, it is held by very many, including the General As-
sembly by a great majority,48 that the provisions of the Protocol con-
stitute rules of customary international law (p. 299). Stein therefore 
deals with the question "Why new Convention after Geneva Proto-
col?" (pp. 337-38). Fresh consideration of the problem is necessary be-
cause many parties qualified their acceptance of the Geneva Protocol 
with important reservations. Furthermore, the scope of the Protocol is 
controversial-particularly in regard to whether it prohibits tear gas 
and defoliants. In addition, since it prohibits the use of chemical 
and bacteriological weapons "in war," uncertainty exists regarding 
its application to hostilities that do not technically amount to "war." 
Perhaps the most important shortcoming is that it only proscribes 
the use but not the possession or production of the specified agents 
(p. 338). The United Kingdom responded to these inadequacies by 
offering a draft Convention limited to biological agents49 "because the 
problem of reaching agreement 'might be made less intractable by 
considering chemical and microbiological methods of warfare sepa-
rately' " (p. 338). This limited approach eventually prevailed over 
the initially strong opposition of the Socialist States, and a separate 
instrument on bacteriological warfare was adopted.50 
43. U.N. Doc. A/8457, Oct. 6, 1971, Annex A. The text of the draft is reprinted at 
66 AM. J. INTL. L. 451-55 (1972). 
44. G.A. Res. 2826, 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. 29 at 30, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1971). 
45. 94 L.N.T.S. 65 (1929). For a recent analysis of the Protocol, see Baxter 8c 
Buergenthal, Legal Aspects of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, 64 AM. J. INTL. L. 853 
(1970). 
46. 94 L.N.T.S. at 67. 
47. 116 CONG, R:£c. 29444 (1970). 
48. G.A. Res, 2603 A (XXIV), 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. 24 at 16, U.N. Doc. A/7890 
(1969). 
49. ENDC/231 at 2 (1968). 
50. See note 43 supra and accompanying text. See also Stein, Legal Restraints in 
Modern Arms Control Agreements, 66 AM. J. INTL. L. 255, 280-86 (1972). 
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Each Party to this Convention undertakes never in any circumstances 
to develop, produce, stockpile, or otherwise acquire or retain: 
(1) Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their 
origins or method of production, of types and in quantities that 
have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful 
purposes; 
(2) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such 
agents or toxins for hostile purposes in armed conflict.51 
Under article II, each party undertakes "to destroy or to divert to 
peaceful purposes, as soon as possible, but not later than nine months 
after the entry into force of the Convention," all the prohibited ma-
terials.52 
The phrase "never in any circumstances" was included, inter alia, 
"to deal with the thorny problem of the reservations to the Geneva 
Protocol by which many parties have retained the right to use the 
weapons covered by the Protocol under specified circumstances."53 
This language is intended to emphasize that the former reservations 
to the Protocol should not detract from the absolute prohibition of 
the Convention even if they remain legally in force.54 In this re-
viewer's opinion, therefore, even though a party to the Protocol-
basing itself on its reservation to the Protocol-might be able to 
claim that it does not violate the obligations under the Protocol by 
the use of certain materials, it would, in so doing, violate its obliga-
tions under the new Convention. 
Under article IX of the Convention each State Party undertakes 
"to continue negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching early 
agreement"55 on the elimination of chemical weapons in response to 
the concern that a prohibition of biological weapons will reduce the 
pressure for a ban on chemical weapons. 56 The Convention will pro-
vide a more stringent legal restraint on the use and stockpiling of 
biological weapons.57 
II. GENERAL QUESTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
This review has concentrated on the new international instru-
ments in the field of armaments that have come into existence in 
51. Art. I, U.N. Doc. A/8457, Oct. 6, 1971, Annex A. Article m contains a "non-
proliferation" provision similar to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which prohibits any 
party from transferring, assisting, encouraging, or inducing any State, group of States, 
or international organizations to manufacture or otherwise acquire "any of the proscribed 
material." 
52. Art. II, U.N. Doc. A/8457, Oct. 6, 1971, Annex A. See Stein, supra note 50, at 283. 
53. Stein, supra note 50, at 283. 
54. Id. 
55. Art. IX, U.N. Doc. A/8457, Oct. 6, 1971, Annex A. 
56. See Stein, supra note 50, at 285. 
57. Id. 
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the post-World War II period illustrating the wide scope of the sec-
tor of the law examined in Professor Stein's Hague Lectures. The 
Lectures are, however, by no means restricted to comments on the 
new instruments. They also contain highly interesting observations 
of a more general nature. An example is provided by Professor Stein's 
arguments for agreements through the conclusion of treaties as con-
trasted with less formal commitments, emphasizing the necessity of 
avoiding "potentially disruptive misunderstandings" (p. 257). Agree-
ments establishing a clearly articulated legal commitment would 
better serve to promote international stability than mere " 'under-
standings,' particularly if they are inadequately articulated" (p. 257). 
Clauses providing for modification, withdrawal, and mandatory re-
view at a specified future time could reconcile the desire for stability 
with the need for flexibility in a rapidly changing world. "Treaty 
law and practice offer a variety of options and this, in fact, was the 
path chosen with respect to all the collateral measures under discus-
sion" (pp. 257-58). Even the United States-U.S.S.R. understanding 
on a direct communications link, though cast in the simplified form 
of a "Memorandum of Understanding," is a treaty in the inter-
national law sense.1i8 
The Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union on 
the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim 
Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of 
Strategic Offensive Arms, as well as the protocol to the latter, signed 
in Moscow on May 26, 1972,59 are recent examples conforming with 
Professor Stein's recommendations. The first is also a treaty under 
United States constitutional law. These instruments were signed on 
behalf of the United States by President Nixon and on behalf of the 
Soviet Union not by the Head of State, the Head of Government, or 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs, but by Leonid I. Brezhnev, General 
Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union. 
III. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
Professor Stein's Lectures present a comprehensive picture of the 
development of international law in the armaments field in the post-
World War II period within and outside the United Nations. Both 
his general observations on the various problems and his comments 
on the individual instruments are highly pertinent and instructive. 
They are an outstanding contribution to the literature of interna-
tional law and are an indispensable source of enlightenment for any 
scholar, teacher, or practitioner who wishes to familiarize himself 
58. In United States constitutional law, the memorandum is considered an executive 
agreement, which does not require consent to ratification by the Senate (p. 258). 
59. Texts are reprinted in 66 DEPT. STATE BuLL., No. 1722, June 26, 1972. 
December 1972] Recent Books 439 
with the present state of the law in the area. This reviewer hopes that 
it will be possible for Professor Stein to publish a comprehensive 
treatise in this field, based on his Hague Lectures, in the not too 
distant future. 
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